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Abstract
Today’s European wine policy is centered on a system of appellations, implemented 
as geographical indications (GIs), that entail significant technological regulations—
restricting the varieties that may be grown, while imposing maximum yields per 
hectare and other rules regarding grape production and winemaking practice. This 
paper outlines the historical development of European wine policy under the CAP, 
and presents a more detailed analysis of the economic consequences of the rules 
and regulations under the appellation system. The introduction of these rules and 
regulations was probably beneficial initially, both for their didactive effect on wine 
producers and consumers and as a way of overcoming a significant “lemons” prob-
lem in the market. However, those same rules and regulations are much less valu-
able today, given (1) the potential for alternative sources of information to solve the 
lemons problem, and (2) evidence that the appellation system per se might not be 
effectively serving that purpose as well as it once did, while some of the regulations 
impose significant social costs. Yield restrictions, in particular, are economically 
inefficient as a way of enhancing and signaling quality (their ostensible purpose) 
and as a way of restricting total supply to support market prices and thus producer 
incomes (a significant motivation). The inherent weaknesses of the policy design 
are compounded by failures of governance. A less heavy-handed approach to policy 
would allow more scope for the market mechanism to match supply and demand for 
this signature product from European agriculture.
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1 Introduction
Around the world, wine markets are in a state of flux: producers are adjusting to 
shifting consumer demand for wine, global production is close to an all-time high, 
and we have once again entered a bust phase in the perennial boom-bust cycle—
hard times for European wine producers, exacerbated by Brexit, President Trump’s 
tariffs, and now the COVID-19 pandemic. This evolving market context is one of 
several factors that has been putting pressure on Europe’s wine policy, which has 
sought for decades to manage the balance of supply and demand and quality of 
European wine, with only partial success.
Today’s European wine policy is centered on a system of appellations, imple-
mented as geographical indications (GIs) for wine that entail significant technologi-
cal regulations—restricting the varieties that may be grown, while imposing maxi-
mum yields per hectare and other rules regarding grape production and winemaking 
practice.1 This system was built over many decades on foundations laid in France in 
the early 1900s. The Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) system was introduced 
in France in 1935 to establish standards for wine production systems—imposing 
regulations on both wine products and the processes used to produce them within 
defined locations—and thereby to create and enhance collective reputations based 
on regions (Haeck et  al. 2019; Meloni et  al. 2019). These regions and their typi-
cal wines were to be distinguished from one another by their unique combinations 
of terroir, varieties, standards, and production methods. The idea spread. In today’s 
global wine market as many as 1239 different wine appellations exist; 57 in Bor-
deaux alone (Livat et al. 2018; IOV 2019). Similar policies were introduced by other 
European wine-producing countries as they joined the European Community (EC), 
and the appellation rules were harmonized under the aegis of an expanding Euro-
pean Union (EU) throughout various reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), most recently in 2013.
The creation of the AOC system in France (and its counterparts in other coun-
tries) may have yielded net social benefits by solving a “lemons” problem, as argued 
by Mérel et al. (2019), or through its didactic effects in educating poorly informed 
wine producers and consumers, or both. Over time, however, the cost–benefit bal-
ance has changed. Restrictions on producer choices over what to produce and how 
to produce it impose social costs that inevitably increase over time (Becker 1983). 
Exacerbating this general phenomenon, regulations on European wine production 
have been held largely immutable over decades during which technological and mar-
ket possibilities for producers have changed immensely. And new demands for adap-
tive responses to climate change can only make matters worse. Meanwhile, improve-
ments in marketing and communications technology, and the rise of alternative 
1 GIs and the associated protected naming rights apply to many other food and non-food products around 
the world. Applications of GIs to wine in Europe date back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and wine is still the predominant user of GIs globally (Meloni et  al. 2019). GIs were established for 
products like ham and cheese in the EU in 1992 (EU Reg. 2081/1992) and, since 2008, the system of GIs 
for wine in Europe now fits within the broader EU-wide system of GIs under the single Common Market 
Organization (EU Reg. 479/2008 Art. 34).
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sources of information, have diminished the potential consumer and producer ben-
efits from quality signals provided by wine appellations embodying information 
about production processes. And, with globalization, the world market has been 
substantially restructured, including a rise in New World wine market shares that 
may be partly attributed to the constraints imposed by the EU policies, and which 
changes the implications of those constraints. The policies have evolved, too, but 
perhaps too slowly.
The appellation system has operated in conjunction with a battery of supply 
management policies. Since the early 1980s, for many years the main concern for 
European wine policymakers was the problem of overproduction of undifferentiated 
table wines. However, as we explain below, this problem of excess capacity has now 
been transmitted to higher quality wines, produced within the system of GIs. These 
designations were introduced to provide a guarantee of excellence, to protect the 
consumer against risk of counterfeiting, and to serve as a symbol of the region of 
production for promoting the positive externalities from collective reputation. They 
may still do all these things, but the linkages between appellation rules and wine 
quality signals are becoming weaker, partly because the world has changed con-
siderably since those rules were introduced. Some producers are finding it in their 
interest to opt out.
The objective of this paper is to explore the European system of appellations for 
wine, its management, the way in which it is regulated, its governance mechanisms, 
and the consequences for wine producers and consumers. In this context, we raise 
questions about the use of technological regulation as an economic policy tool. Eco-
nomic arguments would favor instruments that are closely targeted to the economic 
purpose and that allow market transactions to reveal opportunity costs; ideas that 
have been neglected by EU wine policy.
Meloni et al. (2019) provide a taxonomy of wine regulations which they use to 
compare the EU and the other main producing countries. They note that “The EU 
is not only the largest global wine-producing region and the main importer and 
exporter of wine, but also the most regulated wine market” (Meloni et al., p. 622). 
As the authors highlight, Europe stands out from other producing countries for the 
size of its producer subsidies and the strength of its vineyard regulations seeking to 
increase the quality and restrict the quantity of wine produced. These vineyard regu-
lations are the focus of the present paper, in particular the appellation rules and sup-
ply management policies. These policies are complex, involving diverse instruments 
devised and implemented by the EU, by Member States, and by sub-national organi-
zations acting separately and together. Our analysis takes into account the realities 
of imperfect enforcement and economizing responses by producers and others.2
The paper proceeds as follows. First, in Sect. 2 we introduce the appellation rules 
that are the centerpiece of European wine policy and our main focus. Next, Sect. 3 
2 This analysis abstracts completely from many other aspects of government policy pertaining spe-
cifically to wine production, consumption and trade, such as regulations and taxes on domestic sales 
whether applied for public health or other reasons; tariffs and other trade policies, some of which relate 
to GIs and other intellectual property; antitrust laws and other commercial policies.
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presents a brief history of European policies as they evolved to address a persis-
tent problem of surplus production of lower quality wine. Section 4 documents the 
resulting shifts in structure of the industry over the decades. Section 5 documents 
the consequences of various supply management policies, which has been a major 
emphasis of EU involvement, and a major public expense. Then we shift to the eco-
nomics of appellations. Section 6 delves into GIs as collective brands. Section 7 ana-
lyzes firm-level economics of technological regulations as part of the appellation 
system, and Sect. 8 extends this analysis to the context of the market as a whole. 
Finally, Sect. 9 presents a synthesis of findings and concludes the article.
2  Roots of European Wine Appellations
European wine law has evolved with the formation and expansion of the European 
Union, but its core elements have a century-long history. The main roots of core 
elements of today’s European wine policy can be traced to the “Great Wine Blight” 
in the late nineteenth century, caused by the introduction of the insect, phylloxera, 
which devastated vineyards around the world (Meloni and Swinnen 2013; Chevet 
et  al. 2018). Eventually, the industry recovered by planting European Vitis vinif-
era stock grafted onto American phylloxera-resistant rootstock. But, meanwhile, 
responding to growing demand for wine that could not be satisfied from traditional 
sources, a large “French” wine industry had developed in Algeria; and fake wine or 
tampered wine was being sold (Meloni and Swinnen 2018). The upshot was sev-
eral years of misery for French wine producers, culminating in a crisis in 1907, the 
climax of which was a demonstration in Montpellier by an estimated 600,000 to 
800,000—one in every two residents of lower Languedoc—on June 9, 1907 (Munsie 
2002; Chevet et al. 2018).
Some policy response was inevitable. Ultimately, building on precursor policies 
introduced between 1908 and 1911, France introduced its Appellation d’Origine 
Contrôlée (AOC) system in 1935, eventually to be supplanted by the EU in 2012 
with its Appellation d’Origin Protégée system.3 Appellation rules closely define 
which grape varieties and winemaking practices are approved for classification in 
each of France’s several hundred geographically defined appellations, which can 
cover regions, villages or vineyards. They also specify restrictions on yields per hec-
tare, vineyard area, and planting density, and thus total production for each appel-
lation. This policy innovation spread to other European countries—in particular to 
those countries that joined what was eventually to become the EU.4 The ultimate 
3 Munsie (2002), Haeck et al. (2019) and Mérel et al. (2019) provide details on the AOC system and its 
history. The first French law on viticultural designations of origin dates to 1905 (Chevet et al. 2018, pp. 
69–73).
4 The systems of GIs chosen by Italy, Spain, and Portugal were modeled on that of France. Germany 
opted to use a different system altogether, and Austria followed (see Munsie 2002 for details). Table wine 
is ruled out in Germany since it is not legal to produce wine outside the regions associated with its 13 
PDOs and 26 PGIs (German Wine Institute 2020).
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outcome was a harmonized multinational system of GIs for wine, implemented in 
the context of substantial other government intervention in the market.
The EU wine law was conceived based on a quality pyramid, or hierarchy, with 
details of the structure of the pyramid varying among member countries and chang-
ing over time.5 In the current EU system of GIs, formed in 2008 and preserved in 
the 2013 CAP reform, wines are divided into two main categories: wines with a GI 
(i.e., appellation wine or quality wine), and wines without a GI (i.e., table wine). 
Appellation wines are divided into two sub-categories: Protected Geographical Indi-
cation (PGI) wines and, above that, Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) wines.6 
The European regulatory framework permits the use of different national acronyms 
to preserve the traditional nomenclature introduced by each Member State (such 
as DOC-DOCG and IGT in Italy or AOC in France) to represent these categories 
(Fig. 1).7
3  The CMO for Wine and Wine Policy under a Single CMO: A Brief 
History
The Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine was established in 1970, based 
on foundations laid in regulations passed in 1962 and supported by a common Cus-
toms Tariff passed in 1959 (see, e.g., Munsie 2002).8 It entailed several main ele-
ments in addition to those directly entailed in the appellation system. First, it intro-
duced restrictions on both new plantings and replacement plantings of vines for the 
entire European Economic Community (EEC, now EU). These restrictions were 
closely tied to the appellation system. New plantings in quality wine regions were 
restricted to “recommended” and “authorized” varieties; new plantings for undif-
ferentiated table wines (accounting for some four-fifths of production at the time) 
were restricted to authorized varieties. France applied more restrictive national regu-
lations, permitting only recommended varieties to be planted in AOC regions. Sec-
ond, a binding minimum support price was established for table wine supported by 
5 Gaeta and Corsinovi (2014) describe both an old quality pyramid (p. 187), reflecting the 1999 Regula-
tions (which amended the pyramid established in 1970), and a new quality pyramid (p. 191), reflecting 
the 2008 Regulations and subsequent amendments.
6 The EU imposes a minimal set of regulations on production for any wine. These regulations apply to 
wines without a GI. In contrast, while the EU sets the minimum legal framework, it is left up to each 
Member State to determine the details of its system of classification and control for appellation wines 
within that framework.
7 Some further differentiation is found within PDOs. In Italy, for example, within DOC (corresponding 
to PDO) wines, there is another category represented by DOCG wines (Controlled and Guaranteed Des-
ignation of Origin); and within DOC and DOCG wines, sub-appellations and sub-areas are defined (such 
as Valpolicella Classica within Valpolicella).
8 The CMO for wine was a compromise between the positions of Italy and France. Indeed, as described 
by Munsie (2002, p. 11) “… the main conflict that had to be resolved in bringing together these countries 
[to create the EEC] was the integration of the French and Italian wine industries. Although France and 
Italy were the two biggest wine producing countries, the ways in which they were organized were polar 
opposites.” The French feared that Italian wine would flood the market and cause prices to plummet. 
These fears were to be realized within a few years under the CMO.
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government purchases with complementary instruments for disposing of the result-
ing government stocks. Third, the wine policy provided for obligatory distillation 
to be used as an element of the price support system. Importantly, table wines and 
quality wines were subject to separate regulations and, for three decades, the CMO 
for wine related mainly to table wine production.9 As described by Munsie (2002), 
responsibility for implementing the policies was devolved to a great extent to the 
Member States, especially with respect to the specific technological regulations 
related to quality wine (Reg. 817/70).
Protected Designaon of Origin (PDO) Wine 
Each EU country has its own quality categories that correspond to PDOs.  A place 
name idenfies the wine and its characteriscs, which are defined by the 
delimited geographic area and specific set of rules governing the grape variees 
that may be used, the wine-making methods, the maximum yield (of fruit and 
wine) per hectare, and the analycal traits of the wines.  Compared with PGIs, the 
control system is much more rigorous. A third-party body provides a cerficate 
for the bole (for a fee).   
Protected Geographical Indicaon (PGI) Wine 
PGI wines are classified differently, country-by-country.  The producon rules for 
PGI wines contain some basic regulaons governing producon area and grape 
origin, variees of grapes that may be used, yield per hectare, and chemical-
physical and organolepc characteriscs (such as color and taste).  The state 
provides a system of controls and a body that cerfies the product, but usually 
without providing a cerficate to be applied to the bole.  
Wine Without a GI 
These table wines fall under generic legislaon defining what the term “wine” 
means and how it should be marketed. They are subject to comparavely modest 
regulaons governing producon processes (e.g., the recommended and 
authorized varieties of grapes, and permissible oenological pracces) and product 
aributes (e.g., the allowed range of alcohol % by volume, total acidity), which 
apply minimally to all wines.  
Fig. 1  Heirarchy of European wine appellations
9 “Regulation 816/70 contained the basic provisions to implement the common organization of the wine 
market, while Regulation 817/70 contained provisions specifically aimed at quality wines” (Munsie 
2002, p. 12). These two parts of the wine industry were regulated separately, in this way, until the 1999 
reform.
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3.1  Policy Reforms, 1976–2013
Over the decades since, the wine law has been revised in the context of broader 
changes in the CAP, with substantive changes in the regulations in 1976, 1987, 
1999, 2008, and 2013.10 The changes in policy were mostly responding to problems 
of excess supply and the resulting budgetary cost, but they also reflected shifts in 
thinking and changing market and policy context (European Commission 2020a).11 
Here, we provide a brief chronological overview of the evolving market situation 
and policy emphasis, including budgetary details, to serve as a context for the analy-
sis of particular elements of the policy in the subsequent sections.
Table 1 reveals the shifting balance of budgeted expenditures totaling €54.2 bil-
lion over the years 1971–2023, averaging more than €1.0 billion per year. Corsinovi 
and Gaeta (2017) interpret these shifts in expenditure in terms of three phases of 
policy: (1) focused on price and income support and consequences for supply man-
agement and surplus disposal; (2) still focused on the supply side, but reflecting a 
shift in emphasis to increasing overall quality both to be more competitive globally 
and reduce the cost of supporting unprofitable table wines; (3) focused on demand 
enhancement through quality improvement and product promotion. See, also, Euro-
pean Commission (2020a).
Under the CMO for wine, a very short initial period of equilibrium in the wine 
market was followed first by a very marked increase in production against a rela-
tively constant demand, and eventually, a sustained decline and a very notice-
able qualitative change in demand from the 1980s. Initially, the CMO was very 
open, with no curbs on plantings and very few market regulation instruments, but 
in short order it had generated a serious structural surplus giving rise to several 
policy changes in the 1970s and 1980s.
Beginning with changes in 1976, the policy became very interventionist, seek-
ing to reduce the surplus using tighter restrictions on plantings (Reg. 1162/76) 
and financial incentives for taking vineyards out of production (Reg. 1163/76), 
while at the same time encouraging an increase in the overall quality. The effects 
of these policies and yield-restricting rules for appellation wines notwithstanding, 
wine producers continued to generate significant surpluses. Faced with massive 
harvests in 1979 and 1980 and protests from French producers, distillation was 
introduced as a basic means of regulating the market and eliminating surpluses; 
hitherto it had been used as an exceptional measure. Total expenditures under the 
CMO for wine increased from just €1.6 billion in the first decade (1971–1980) 
to €12.7 billion in the second (1981–1990), averaging €1.3 billion per year, 
10 Our description of the historical development of European wine policy draws on Munsie (2002), Mel-
oni et al. (2019), and Pomarici and Sardone (2020), in particular, but also Gaeta and Corsinovi (2014) 
and Meloni and Swinnen (2016), among others. The European Commission (2004) provides a detailed 
ex post evaluation of the wine CMO through 2002. More recent coverage is provided by Agrosynergie 
(EEG) (2019).
11 Further changes are envisioned in the 2018 proposal for CAP post-2020 (see Pomarici and Sardone 
2020), but these ideas might have been overtaken by subsequent events including Brexit, the Trump tar-
iffs, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
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predominantly for distillation and other measures to reduce the surplus of table 
wine.
In 1987, the patchwork of regulations and amendments was revamped and 
consolidated. Reg. 822/87 contained many of the past provisions but sought to 
strengthen them in order to push yields down and quality up, while Reg. 823/87 
focused on quality wines, containing many of the same provisions as Reg. 817/70. 
These two regulations (822/87 and 823/87) formed the backbone of the CMO for 
wine until the 1999 reform undertaken as part of Agenda 2000. Expenditure averag-
ing more than €1.5 billion per year during the 1990s continued to emphasize instru-
ments that would reduce the surplus and support producer prices and incomes, but 
with some shifting toward instruments that would reduce productive capacity and 
enhance quality.
The 1999 reform to the CMO for wine was relatively modest.12 Regulation 
1493/99 replaced and consolidated the main wine policy regulations and their patch-
work amendments; for the first time, a single regulation governing both quality wine 
and table wine. Changes made here sought to: (1) achieve a better balance between 
supply and demand on the Community market; (2) give producers the chance to 
bring production into line with a market demanding higher quality; and (3) allow the 
sector to become competitive in the long term—especially in the face of increased 
global competition under the GATT. All of this was to be accomplished by financ-
ing the restructuring of a large part of present vineyards (see European Commission 
2020a, b). This 1999 reform proved insufficient to reduce wine surpluses and con-
siderable sums still had to be spent on disposing of them. A new reform of the wine 
market was needed. Adding to the existing pressures for reform, EU enlargement 
had integrated several more wine-producing countries (Hungary, Slovakia and Slo-
venia in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007).
Surpluses were addressed initially through subsidized distillation of wine (to 
make distillate for biofuel and other industrial use as well as for potable use) and 
market withdrawals. Expenditure on these instruments grew from €1.1 billion 
in 1971–1980 to €8.5 billion during 1981–1990, but then declined to €5.2 bil-
lion during 1991–2000 and subsequently continued to diminish in absolute terms 
and as a share of expenditure on wine industry support. The balance was shifting 
to other instruments. As Corsinovi and Gaeta (2017) document, the quantities of 
wine distilled represented 21% of total EU wine production in 1981–1994, 13% in 
1994–2007, and 11% in 2007–2011, after which these measures were phased out. 
The more rapidly shrinking subsidy expenditures reflected a smaller rate of sub-
sidy applied to a shrinking volume distilled under subsidy. Table 1 includes details 
on expenditure on various other policies, which were important at times. Notable 
among these are subsidies for concentrated grape must (significant outlays in the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s) and for storage of wine as a means of smoothing out sup-
ply and prices between seasons (significant outlays in the 1980s and 1990s), which 
12 As described by Meloni et al. (2019), since the 1990s pressure to reform the EU wine policy grew 
from a loss of competitiveness, high budget costs, and new challenges such as climate change and 
demands for sustainable farming. However, substantive policy reform has been resisted stiffly by produc-
ers, as exemplified by the failed attempt at radical reform in 1994 (see also Pomarici and Sardone 2020).
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are combined with expenditures on export subsidies and other interventions under 
“Aid for market regulation.”13
Bolder reforms were adopted by the EU in 2008 (see European Commission 
2020a and Pomarici and Sardone 2020). Significant changes were made to policy 
instruments and the emphasis among them, and in implementation. Several tradi-
tional market intervention measures were eliminated, others were consolidated, and 
new ones were introduced. Responsibility for the detailed implementation of spe-
cific measures was devolved to individual Member States, and traditional market 
measures were combined with structural measures financed by a national envelope. 
The emphasis of the expenditure shifted from measures that would mainly apply 
to table wine to measures that would encourage the production of quality wine but 
with the detail of the implementation varying considerably from country to country 
within the EU.
The 2008 wine policy reform anticipated the 2013 general CAP reform. These 
changes made it easy to include the wine policy crafted in 2008 within the single 
CMO implemented in 2013 under Reg. 1308/2013. Pomarici and Sardone (2020) 
document in detail the full provisions in that policy, which applies for the period 
2014–2020, and budgeted amounts directed to each of five structural measures and 
three conjunctional measures, collectively amounting to something over €1.0 billion 
per year. As can be seen in Table 1, comparing the period since 2008 with the period 
before then, the balance of the expenditure shifted profoundly toward restructuring 
and conversion, investments and innovation, and promotion—activities that promote 
quality wine as opposed to activities that support table wine and manage surplus 
production and stocks.
This period saw changes in the system of planting rights, which had been in force 
in some form since 1970 (see Sect. 5 for details). In 2008, the EU ministers of agri-
culture adopted a proposal by the European Commission to liberalize the regime 
by 2018. However, this proposal was opposed and overturned. Current rules imple-
mented in January 2016 extend the planting restrictions to 2030, with some sig-
nificant changes from the system in force for 1983–2015. First, authorizations are 
granted for free but are now non-transferable. Second, new authorizations allow up 
to 1% per year growth of a Member State’s area under vines. Third, authorizations 
may now be used for vines without a GI.
13 Much European wine is fortified by the addition of sucrose (from sugar beet or sugar cane) or rectified 
concentrated grape must (a sugary solution derived from grape juice)—as required to achieve minimum 
alcohol concentration required by EU and appellation rules, as well as for commercial reasons. The addi-
tion of sucrose is forbidden in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, or Southern France. Regulations 
have changed over time regarding the use of concentrated must—currently allowed only in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. In Italy, subsidies on use of grape must for fortifying wines were helpful both in 
reducing the problem of excess supply and in assisting financially straitened producers in the south, 
while generally supporting producers.
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4  Efforts to Reduce Persistent Problems
Problems of surplus production of table wine have been a recurrent feature of the 
European wine industry, exacerbated by the incentives provided by the market 
intervention elements of the EU wine policy. Most of the expenditures in Table 1 
relate to this issue. The market support policies exacerbated the problems of 
excess capacity in the industry by encouraging investment or slowing disinvest-
ment in ways that contradicted longer-term trends in market demand. In particu-
lar, especially in the earlier period of the CMO, they encouraged production of 
lower-tier wine. Meanwhile, the structure of demand was changing: demand was 
shifting against lower-tier European wine.
As documented by Anderson et al. (2018) and Holmes and Anderson (2017), 
the demand for European wine has been shifting in three ways. First, with glo-
balization and increases in average income, age, and health-consciousness of 
consumers, per capita consumption of alcohol has declined, and the mix has 
shifted away from wine and towards other forms of alcohol—especially in tradi-
tional wine-consuming countries like France, Italy, and Spain. Second, the mix 
of demand in Europe and elsewhere has shifted towards more expensive wine—a 
trend of premiumization. Third, New World producers have increased their pro-
duction, competing with European wine especially in the lower-priced tier. These 
changes in demand facing the European wine industry called for adjustments in 
production, but these were slowed by EU policies that blunted the signals from 
the market, coupled with an inherently inelastic supply response in an industry 
based on perennial crop.
Eventually, the excess supply problem was addressed by a combination of poli-
cies that reduced excess capacity directly, along with both a progressive reduction 
of the support price for table wine and other policies to encourage higher-quality 
wine production. Considerable changes were wrought in the structure of Euro-
pean wine production, especially in the balance between appellation wine (PDO 
or PGI) and table wine. Table 2 includes details on the area of vineyard and on 
the production of wine for both PDO/PGI wine and table wine for four countries 
(Germany, Spain, France, and Italy), which together contributed the great bulk of 
European wine production, since 1985.
In 1990, after 20 years under the CMO, the four countries (Table 2, panel a) 
together had 3.3 million ha of wine grapes of which 44.1% was appellation wine; 
the share of production (Table 2, panel b) was lower (35.9%), reflecting the higher 
yield for table wines. During the 1980s and 1990s, the CMO interventions con-
tinued to support table wine, and its share of the total area and volume of produc-
tion remained high. But after the turn of the century, the structure of production 
shifted much more rapidly, reflecting a shift in policy seeking both to reduce the 
total area of vineyard and to increase the quality wine share in that total.
By 2018, the total the area of vineyard had fallen by almost 1 million ha (30%) 
from the peak in 1990, with most of the reduction accomplished by 2010 (Table 2, 
panel a). Production fell by a smaller proportion, reflecting increases in average 
yields as poorly producing vineyards were being grubbed out (Table 2, panel b). 
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The share of appellation wine had increased to almost 50% of the total area and 
more than 50% of the total volume by 2000, and by 2018 it was up to 75% of the 
area and over 60% of the volume. However, some of this change reflected the fact 
that the new 2008 regulation restructured the categories and changed the defini-
tion of appellation wines. Certain table wines were simply elevated to the rank of 
PGI wines, without any change in their quality.
In spite of the efforts over many years to improve the balance of supply and 
demand, a significant structural surplus remains, especially for table wine but now 
also for some appellation wine. In 2019, the EU spent a total of €1.2 billion sup-
porting the wine industry, one way or another. The long-term structural problem 
of excess capacity in the EU was exacerbated by a depressed global wine market. 
These difficulties were compounded for the EU industry by trade disputes with the 
United States, manifest as tariffs on imports of wine from the EU.14 Adding to these 
woes, in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic devastated the wine industry world-
wide, by causing closure of restaurants and bars and winery tasting rooms.15
5  Supply Management Policies
Various supply management policies were introduced at different times to mitigate 
the consequences of excess capacity and surplus production in the European wine 
industry, including subsidized distillation of wine, other supply diversion instru-
ments, subsidies for grubbing out vineyards, and planting restrictions. Among these 
instruments, planting restrictions are the most intrusive and most important. Indeed, 
as Meloni et al. (2019, p. 639) say, given the size and significance of the EU wine 
industry, “…the European system of vineyard planting restrictions is one of the most 
important policies affecting global wine markets today.”
Problems of excess supply became apparent early on. Planting rights were 
introduced at the outset, in 1970—limiting the total area of vineyards by regulat-
ing new plantings.16 Since then, policies restricting new plantings have remained 
in force, with some variation in the details over time including some significant 
14 On October 2, 2019, the World Trade Organization (WTO) authorized the United States to impose 
duties on $7.5 billion worth of European goods after the EU was found guilty of unfair subsidies asso-
ciated with Airbus. On the following day, the Trump administration announced 25 percent tariffs on a 
wide range of European products, including wine with less than 14% alcohol by volume, which went into 
effect October 18, 2019.
15 Responding to this crisis, on May 4, 2020, the European Commission published several measures, 
based on available support under the CAP and the CMO, to help rebalance supply of wine to adjust to 
the shifting demand caused by the COVID-19 crisis. These measures include private storage aid and flex-
ibility in the implementation of market support programs—including a provision for Member States to 
include by-product distillation for industrial use under their National Support Programs (NSPs). On July 
7, 2020, the European Commission announced additional exceptional measures, including increases in 
the EU’s contributions for NSPs (up to 70%) and advanced payments for crisis distillation and storage, 
and called for proposals for promotion programs.
16 EU rules on planting rights are based on French regulations tracing back several centuries, with royal 
edicts restricting the planting of vines in the Bordeaux region as early as 1725. After a liberal period fol-
lowing the French Revolution, restrictions were again imposed in the 1930s and further strengthened in 
the postwar period. These regulations served as the basis for regulations in the EU, initially introduced in 
1970 and further strengthened in 1976 and 1984 (see Deconinck and Swinnen 2015; Meloni et al. 2019).
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changes in 2016, as noted above (see, e.g., Meloni et al. 2019; Pomarici and Sar-
done 2020). Deconinck and Swinnen (2015) present a detailed and elegant anal-
ysis of the economic consequences of this complex policy, which created vari-
ous rights (replanting rights; rights for planting from a reserve; and new planting 
rights) that were to some extent transferable among producers and places. In their 
base analysis, Deconinck and Swinnen (2015) assume perfect enforcement of a 
freely transferable production right—treating an area right as effectively a right 
to produce and sell winegrapes and wine. In subsequent sections, they explore 
consequences of restrictions on transfers, reserves, and imperfect enforcement of 
these rights. Throughout their analysis, however, Deconinck and Swinnen (2015) 
treat land as the only input and assume uniform, exogenous quality. This assump-
tion is open to challenge, and it matters.
Previous studies have shown that producers will respond to area restrictions by 
intensifying the use of other inputs per unit area, which has the effect of increas-
ing yield and (typically) reducing intrinsic output quality; conversely, producers 
will respond to output restrictions by managing production to increase quality, 
at the expense of yield (e.g., see Foster and Babcock 1990, 1993; Alston and 
James 2002; James and Alston 2002). Planting rights for wine grapes might have 
entailed some such effects. In the case of low-quality (table) wine, the EU area 
restrictions did not also entail yield restrictions, so producers had an incentive to 
intensify use of variable inputs and yield, even if it resulted in lower quality. In 
contrast, in the case of appellation wines, if maximum yield rules were already 
binding, the addition of area restrictions implied an output restriction of the type 
assumed by Deconinck and Swinnen (2015). However, if other inputs are variable 
and producers can profitably vary input proportions, an output restriction should 
induce an increase in quality. In other words, in the context of the European wine 
markets, we expect planting restrictions induced an increase in average quality for 
appellation wines, a decrease in average quality for table wines, and an increase 
in the quantity of low- relative to high-quality wines. The ultimate impacts in 
such a case depend on the extent to which rights are transferable between high- 
and low-quality production systems, and on the role of other interventions.
In parallel with the declining expenditure on distillation subsidies since 1990, 
expenditure increased on subsidies for grubbing up or abandonment of vineyards 
(reducing total capacity), for restructuring and reconversion of vineyards (shift-
ing from low- to higher-quality production), and green harvesting (removing 100% 
of fruit from selected vineyards to reduce supply in the current vintage). Expend-
iture on these instruments grew from €0.3 billion during 1981–1990, to €3.1 bil-
lion during 1991–2000, €3.8 billion during 2001–2010, and €3.8 billion during the 
5 years, 2011–2015, with the balance shifting over time from grubbing up to green 
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Table 2  Shifting structure of European wine production, 1985–2018
Type by country Year
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2018
(a) Vineyard area
 Total (thousand hectares of vineyard)
  Germany 100.6 102.4 105.7 104.7 102.0 97.0 100.2
  Spain – 1390.4 1154.0 1167.7 1136.4 852.6 814.0
  France 942.0 889.1 865.8 907.0 897.1 785.7 764.0
  Italy 942.7 892.7 823.9 908.0 718.9 663.0 615.0
  Total 1985.3 3274.5 2949.5 3087.4 2854.4 2398.3 2293.1
 PDO/PGI (thousand hectares of vineyard)
  Germany 100.6 102.4 105.7 104.7 102.0 96.8 100.0
  Spain – 667.3 596.8 619.8 656.4 525.1 505.0
  France 493.5 515.4 522.1 536.2 543.0 674.4 663.1
  Italy 198.7 160.3 183.1 242.9 286.0 320.9 444.7
  Total 792.7 1445.3 1407.8 1503.7 1587.4 1617.1 1712.8
 Table wine (thousand hectares of vineyard)
  Germany – – – 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
  Spain – 723.1 557.2 547.9 480.0 307.5 289.1
  France 446.6 373.7 343.8 334.2 314.4 105.1 93.7
  Italy 744.0 732.4 652.3 481.9 432.9 304.8 125.3
  Total 1190.6 1829.2 1553.2 1364.0 1227.3 717.6 508.4
 % PDO/PGI (percent)
  Germany 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.8
  Spain – 48.0 51.7 53.1 57.8 61.6 62.0
  France 52.4 58.0 60.3 59.1 60.5 85.8 86.8
  Italy 21.1 18.0 22.2 26.8 39.8 48.4 72.3
  Total 39.9 44.1 47.7 48.7 55.6 67.4 74.7
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harvesting and, more importantly restructuring and reconversion of vineyards. Sub-
sidies for restructuring and reconversion of vineyards contributed to a significant 
reduction in excess capacity, especially at the troublesome low-quality end of the 
spectrum, contributing to premiumization in terms of the varietal mix and loca-
tion of production within and among the main Member States. Over the period 
Source: Created by the authors drawing on various online sources including: http:// appsso. euros tat. ec. 
europa. eu/ nui/ show. do? datas et= vit_ an7& lang= en, https:// appsso. euros tat. ec. europa. eu/ nui/ show. do? 
datas et= vit_ an5& lang= en, http:// appsso. euros tat. ec. europa. eu/ nui/ show. do? datas et= ef_ lpc_ viney d& 
lang= en, https:// ec. europa. eu/ agric ulture/ sites/ agric ulture/ files/ wine/ stati stics/ harve st- forec ast- 2018- 
2019_ en. pdf, https:// ec. europa. eu/ agric ulture/ sites/ agric ulture/ files/ wine/ stati stics/ histo ric- market- situa 
tion_ fr. pdf, http:// serie stori che. istat. it/ index. php? id= 1& no_ cache= 1& tx_ userc ento_ cento fe% 5Bcat ego-
ria% 5D= 13& tx_ userc ento_ cento fe% 5Bact ion% 5D= show& tx_ userc ento_ cento fe% 5Bcon troll er% 5D= 
Categ oria& cHash= e3503 d8195 dd423 1ff53 ba078 ad5c1 24
Table 2  (continued)
Type by country Year
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2018
(b) Wine production
 Total (thousand hectolitres)
  Germany 5.4 8.5 8.9 10.1 9.1 7.0 10.3
  Spain – 42.2 22.7 46.1 41.1 40.7 49.6
  France 69.2 65.5 55.6 59.8 53.4 46.5 49.6
  Italy 62.3 54.9 59.3 54.1 50.6 50.6 55.8
  Total 137.0 171.1 146.5 170.1 154.2 144.8 165.2
 PDO/PGI (thousand hectolitres)
  Germany 5.4 8.5 8.9 10.1 9.1 6.9 9.6
  Spain – 20.5 13.3 25.5 12.1 17.5 21.4
  France 19.3 23.6 24.6 36.0 34.3 36.1 36.9
  Italy 7.9 8.8 9.8 14.9 15.0 31.3 35.9
  Total 32.5 61.5 56.6 86.5 70.5 91.8 103.8
 Table wine (thousand hectolitres)
  Germany – – – – 0.0 0.1 0.1
  Spain – 21.7 9.4 20.7 29.0 21.3 23.4
  France 50.0 41.9 31.0 23.8 19.2 10.1 12.7
  Italy 54.5 46.1 49.5 39.2 35.5 19.1 17.9
  Total 104.5 109.6 89.9 83.6 83.8 50.6 54.0
 %PDO/PGI (percent)
  Germany 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.7 93.6
  Spain – 48.7 58.8 55.2 29.4 42.9 43.1
  France 27.8 36.1 44.2 60.2 64.1 77.7 74.4
  Italy 12.6 16.1 16.5 27.6 29.7 61.9 64.4
  Total 23.7 35.9 38.7 50.9 45.7 63.4 62.8
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2009–2023, restructuring and reconversion was the largest line item, accounting for 
41.1 percent of budgeted expenditure on wine under the CAP (European Commis-
sion 2020b).
As the European Commission reports (2004, p. 65): “… during the first period 
(1977–1984), yield was on average increasing [by] about 0.9 HL/ha annually. Dur-
ing the second period (1985–1996), yield decreased by about 0.1 HL/ha per year. 
Between 1996 and 2000 yields annually increase about 0.66 HL/ha. … This indi-
cates that yields seem to have been influenced by the CMO instruments (compulsory 
distillation, which discouraged high yields, and the premium for permanent aban-
donment which reduced the area of high yield, low-quality vineyards).”17 The report 
describes specifically how the changes in rules over time coincided with the changes 
in the path of yields.
6  Economic Consequences of GIs for European Wine
The pre-existing appellation law in France contributed substantively to the design 
of the counterparts in the CMO for wine established in 1970, with core elements 
carrying forward to the present day. When the AOC policy was introduced in 1935, 
it combined two government purposes: (1) overcoming the lemons problem and (2) 
reducing total supply, especially of low quality wine.18 First, the lemons problem 
was to be addressed indirectly, by regulating the process of production (varieties, 
yields, winemaking practice) for wines that could be labeled as coming from a par-
ticular AOC, adding to the signal of quality associated with the place (i.e., the GI, 
alone). The resulting premia for wines from within the AOCs made it attractive for 
eligible producers to comply with the requirements, and for other producers to strive 
to establish their eligibility; the rights, attached to land within particular AOCs, 
became valuable almost immediately. Second, given the participation of eligible 
producers, the regulation of their yields reduced supply directly.
These two main effects together led to improvements in profitability for grow-
ers, and probably benefited consumers as well—although consumers must be made 
worse off by an increase in price associated with supply restriction per se, the “car-
tel” aspect of the policy. Mérel et al. (2019, p. 3) concluded that the “market price 
of appellation wine in France increased significantly due to the recognition of AOC 
vineyards, by a value roughly equal to 45% of the average price of wine.” Applying 
that price increase to the 30.5% of French vineyards eligible for AOC recognition 
implies a very substantial gross welfare gain (on the order of 14% of the gross value 
18 AOC wine producers wanted to market their wines as distinctly different from table wine; they were 
not so much interested in reduced volume from those areas, and not so much changing practices as codi-
fying them. At the same time, producers of table wine sought and were granted a minimum (floor) price, 
which was conditional on some measure of supply control. See Loubère (1990).
17 An increase of 0.9 HL/ha/year over seven years, 1977–84 amounts to 6.3 HL/ha on a base of about 35 
HL/ha/year.
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of production), but this does not account for the added costs of “…quality-enhanc-
ing practices required for wines sold under the AOC label” (Mérel et al. 2019, p. 4).
Today’s EU wine law contains corresponding elements that purport to achieve 
similar purposes related to signaling quality and managing total supply. However, 
the market situation is different in several important ways, making it less likely that 
the policy is beneficial to society as a whole; to be sure, some consumers and some 
producers are made worse off. To analyze the economic consequences of the EU 
wine policy it is helpful to tease out its two main elements: first, the creation of 
GIs, which can be used to convey signals of quality and create a collective reputa-
tion associated with a place per se (or perhaps its terroir); and second, technological 
regulations: restrictions on the production process for wine to be designated as com-
ing from a particular GI.19
6.1  Geographical Indications as Collective Brands
GIs enable the creation of collective brands associated with particular production 
regions.20 In principle, by defining the production process, the regulations provide 
some assurance of product quality attributes, thereby facilitating the creation of a 
collective reputation (Winfree and McCluskey 2005).21 This collective reputation 
can be an extremely valuable asset to individual producers, as reflected in land val-
ues. The word Champagne, for example, refers to sparkling wine from the Cham-
pagne region produced according to the rules for that appellation. The collective 
brand Champagne therefore connotes a product defined in terms of both the place 
where it was produced (including the terroir) and the process of production. It con-
flates the place and the technological regulations.
It is not a simple matter to pull these elements apart, though we can readily imag-
ine a scenario in which currently disallowed grape varieties or production practices 
might be profitably employed by a Champagne house, nowadays, without harming 
quality or the collective reputation of the region, if it would be allowed. Collective 
brand-names like Champagne are jealously protected because they serve as a bar-
rier to entry that prevents free-riding. If a comparable wine is produced by the same 
process in some other region, such as Franciacorta, it is not allowed to be called 
19 The GIs for wine can be viewed as an element of the broader EU system of GIs for agri-food products 
(see, e.g., Moschini et al. 2008) for which, in its effects, the whole may be greater than the sum of its 
parts—if, for example, the use of GIs to differentiate and signal quality attributes for EU wine has spillo-
ver benefits across other EU agri-food products, and vice versa. Here we ignore those potential cross-
commodity spillovers and focus on the direct consequences of the rules and regulations within the GIs 
for wine in Europe.
20 Menapace and Moschini (2012) distinguish between GIs, which create collective reputation by signal-
ing intrinsic quality associated with geography or terroir, and trademarks, which are firm-specific and 
private and can be used in a complementary fashion with GIs.
21 Hedonic studies by economists have produced a mixture of results on the value of terroir (see, e.g., 
the extensive listing of studies and discussion by Haeck et al., 2019). Nevertheless, there appears to be a 
clear general association of quality and price with the place of production for wine, and producers per-
ceive returns to creating a collective reputation associated with a PDO. See Frick and Simmoins (2013) 
and studies they cite regarding the economics of collective reputation for wine.
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Champagne.22 Under the umbrella of the collective brand-name for the appellation, 
individual wineries may produce a diverse range of wines that they can sell under 
their own individual brand name(s) or trademarks. One open question is the extent 
to which individual brands can be seen as complements to or substitutes for the col-
lective brand-name of the appellation (see, e.g., Menapace and Moschini 2012).23
In other countries, regional appellations are also used widely for wines, in many 
cases without any comparable technological regulations. This provides a basis for 
comparison from which we might draw inferences about the potential consequences 
if European governments were to eliminate process regulation, while preserving the 
other GI aspects of the EU policy. The United States offers an informative exam-
ple. As described by Lapsley et al. (2019), in 1980 the U.S. Government created its 
counterpart to PDOs, American Viticultural Areas (AVAs—see U.S. Treasury/TTB, 
2013).24 In 2019, the United States had a total of 245 established AVAs. California, 
which produces about 90% of U.S. wine, has 139 AVAs of which 16 are located 
in the Napa Valley AVA (see U.S. Treasury/TTB 2018).25 Prices of wine and the 
grapes used to produce it vary considerably among AVAs, even within the state of 
California, which includes diverse wine regions (see, e.g., Alston et al. 2015).
Even though the AVA rules do not prescribe maximum yields or varieties, pro-
ducers in California are known to manage their yields with a view to enhancing 
quality, and some wineries market their wines as produced from low-yielding vines. 
In practice, a relatively small range of varieties predominates, chosen by growers to 
match their terroir and the market (see Alston et al. 2015). Consequently, even with-
out any regulation requiring it, varieties tend to be associated with AVAs—such as 
Cabernet Sauvignon with the Napa Valley AVA and its sub-appellations, and Pinot 
Noir with the Willamette Valley AVA and its sub-appellations in Oregon as well 
as the Carneros AVA in California. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, even though the 
Napa Valley AVA includes part of the Carneros AVA, which is more like Burgundy, 
the mix of varieties grown in the Napa Valley AVA corresponds closely to the mix 
grown in Bordeaux (Gironde). In both places, a few varieties dominate. Just six vari-
eties (Cabernet Sauvignon, Cabernet Franc, Chardonnay, Merlot, Sauvignon Blanc, 
24 AVAs are defined geographic areas that may be quite large and cross state or county lines, or may 
be quite small and lie within a county or, in some cases, another AVA. The Napa Valley AVA is, for 
instance, a large AVA located within Napa County. The Oakville AVA is a much smaller AVA that is 
located within the Napa Valley AVA. In contrast, the Carneros AVA is a defined AVA in the southern 
portion of Napa and Sonoma Counties.
25 Wineries may identify the grapes used in a wine as coming from an AVA if 85 percent of the grapes 
were grown in the AVA and the wine is fully finished in the state where the AVA is located.
22 International trade issues have arisen over the use of names such as Champagne or Chianti to 
describe wines produced in other regions, in particular by New World producers. These issues have been 
addressed in various international fora, such as the WTO and the OIV, and are the subject of various 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. The relevant EU regulations were revised in 2008 and 2013 (Reg. 
4798/2008 and Reg. 1308/2013).
23 For example, the Bordeaux region produces both Château Petrus (in Pomerol) and Château Cheval 
Blanc (in Saint-Émilion). It does not seem likely that either of these iconic wine labels benefits much, 
nowadays, from being associated with the region in which it is produced; though they might have ben-
efited in the past, and they might confer a halo effect on their less-highly rated neighbors.
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and Semillon) account for 96% of production in Bordeaux; the same six varieties 
account for almost 80% of production in the Napa Valley even though producers 
could freely choose to plant many others. Moreover, as discussed by Alston et al. 
(2015), the main premium wine producing regions of California, Oregon, and Wash-
ington State grow a mix of wine grape varieties that is very similar to the mix in 
France, and becoming more so over time.26 As discussed by Anderson (2014), this is 
a more widespread global phenomenon.
6.2  Too Many Appellations?
As in Europe, we can observe a hierarchy of sub-appellations in other countries, with 
a tendency for the broadest appellation to be associated with the lowest-priced wines, 
and for prices to increase as the (sub-)appellation becomes narrower, and more-spe-
cific (if it were not so, the winery would choose not to use the narrower, more-specific 
Table 3  Comparing Napa and Bordeaux: area of vineyard for top 10 varieties in 2017–2018
Source: Created by the authors drawing on the 2018 Agricultural Commissioner’s Report for Napa 
County. Available at https:// www. count yofna pa. org/ Docum entCe nter/ View/ 13095/ 2018- Napa- Crop- 
report- Engli sh- Versi on-? bidId=, and France AgriMer Stats 2017. Les chiffres de la filière viti-vinicole, 
Données statistiques 2007/2017, 2018. Available at https:// www. franc eagri mer. fr/ conte nt/ downl oad/ 
59141/ 920125/ file/ chiff res- fili% C3% A8re- viti- vinic ole- 2007- 2017. pdf
Bordeaux (Gironde) Napa county
Variety Area (Ha) Share Variety Area (Ha) Share
Merlot 71,637 58.5 Cabernet Sauv 8801 46.5
Cabernet Sauv 2901 19.5 Merlot 1738 9.2
Cabernet Franc 9712 7.9 Other reds 1340 7.1
Cot/Malbec 1811 1.5 Pinot noir 1142 6.0
Petit verdot 1094 0.9 Zinfandel 523 2.8
Other reds 655 0.5 Cabernet Franc 489 2.6
Petite sirah 351 1.8
Semillon 6433 5.3 Petit verdot 321 1.7
Sauvignon blanc 5934 4.9 Syrah 279 1.5
Muscadelle 750 0.6
Colombard 271 0.2 Chardonnay 2481 13.1
Chardonnay 127 0.1 Sauvignon blanc 1138 6.0
Other whites 56 0.1 Other whites 316 1.7
Total 122,381 100.0 Total 18,917 100.0
26 Between 1970 and 2019, California’s total area of grapes used for wine making at least doubled 
(USDA/NASS 1970–2019). Meanwhile, the industry shifted to premium varieties and toward premium 
locations in the cooler coastal valleys. This shift to quality wine was probably larger than the shift to 
quality wine in France, and it was achieved by the unfettered working of the market mechanism, without 
central direction or massive government expenditure.
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designation).27 Since more-specific appellations tend to signal higher-priced wines, 
wineries tend to prefer, where possible, to use narrower designations resulting in a 
greater number of smaller GIs—possibly beyond that implied by heterogeneous terroir 
alone.
This tendency might have contributed to the phenomenon reported by Livat et al. 
(2018) in the case of Bordeaux: we can have too many appellations, in the sense that 
they no longer serve as an effective signal of quality for consumers. The situation can 
be seen as a kind of over-fishing problem if it is profitable for a particular group of pro-
ducers to create an incremental appellation (or sub-appellation) but not for society as a 
whole. The overfishing problem arises if this behavior leads to an excessive number of 
appellations, creating the type of information problem the policy was meant to solve.28
A further potential source of confusion is the changing geographical scope and 
nature of some appellations. Champagne and Prosecco provide interesting examples of 
adaptation at work. In the case of Champagne, reflecting the fact that the boundaries 
of appellations are somewhat arbitrary, the area of the denomination has been increas-
ing—it grew from 30,900 ha in 2007 to 33,800 ha in 2017.29 In the case of Prosecco, 
the redefinition of the appellation in the same time frame was much more radical, with 
three major changes introduced in 2009.30 In the years since, the world has witnessed 
great growth in production and export of Prosecco wine (made by the méthode char-
mat), especially to the UK market, where it has substantially displaced Spanish Cava 
(made by the more expensive méthode champenoise).31
29 The first Appellation (zone) in Champagne was delimited in 1908. In 1911, under pressure from the 
excluded areas, the government created two zones: the original (1908) Champagne Appellation was 
called “Champagne AO Zone 1” and a second Appellation was called “Champagne AO Zone 2.” As of 
1927, Champagne Zone 1 and Champagne Zone 2 were regrouped into a single Appellation (see Haeck 
et al. 2019).
30 Until recently, Prosecco was protected as an appellation for DOC wine produced in a relatively small 
geographic area within the Veneto region of Italy. In response to a perceived market opportunity, some 
producers sought PDO status for Prosecco under European law, and they succeeded. The upshot was 
three major changes, implemented in the 2009 vintage. First, a new DOC for Prosecco was established 
over a vastly expanded region extending almost to Trieste, so as to be able include the town of Pro-
secco—as required under European law if Prosecco is to be used as the place-name for the GI. Second, 
the variety Prosecco was renamed Glera, still the primary variety that can be used to make Prosecco 
wine, such that the word Prosecco now serves exclusively as a GI. Third, the original areas were pro-
moted to DOCG status—advantaged in principle, but with their collective brand to be somewhat under-
mined by the much lower-cost DOC Prosecco produced from grapes grown on the plains with much 
higher yields and using mechanized production systems.
31 Distretto Del Conegliano Valdobbiadene (2018) documents an increase in exports of Prosecco to the 
UK market from 482,288 bottles in 2003 to 7,444,945 bottles in 2017, increasing from 4.5 to 20.5% of 
total UK imports of PDO sparkling wine at the expense of Cava and Champagne.
27 Using data on 8800 California wines, Kwon et al. (2008) found evidence that narrower GIs were cor-
related with an increase in perceived quality, as indicated by the price of wine.
28 As a component of this problem, there is not a clear and unambiguous ranking of quality—as per-
ceived by consumers and reflected in prices—as we go up the quality pyramid (see, e.g., Appendix 
Box B-2).
1 3
Reflections on the Political Economy of European Wine…
7  Technological Regulation
Clearly, wine producers worldwide see virtue in establishing GIs as a way of creat-
ing a collective brand associated with a particular place of production. At issue is 
the extent to which the technological regulations in the GIs for European wine con-
tribute to the value of the wine, by enhancing quality and signaling quality in ways 
that are valuable for producers, consumers, and the society as a whole. The answer 
to this question may have changed over time.
In 1935 when the AOC system was first introduced in France, the situation in the 
wine industry was quite chaotic in a market flooded with poor-quality wines pro-
duced with ill-favored varieties. The designers of the AOC system identified the best 
varieties for each region and production practices that would contribute to making 
better wines; to a great extent these were the major producers in each AOC, codi-
fying their established practices. By promoting the adoption of these varieties and 
practices, the introduction of the AOC system eventually helped to reduce the wine 
glut, to improve wine quality for producers who chose to participate, and to reduce 
the lemons problem.32
A more subtle and longer-term consequence is that, at least for a time, the stric-
tures over eligible production practices and processes promoted learning-by-doing 
and a culture of quality management in the industry, both in grape-growing and vini-
fication. In addition, consumers were able to become better educated about wine 
quality through increased availability of more differentiated wine. These didactic 
aspects were a direct consequence of the regulations but they also enhanced other 
benefits by encouraging participation. Similarly, the introduction of appellation wine 
rules had a mixture of consequences in the 1960s and 1970s in Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal, including didactic elements. At issue is whether the current set of process 
regulations continues to yield benefits of this nature. At least some of the benefits 
from inducing a transformation of the industry and its culture, reducing the lemons 
problem, and facilitating consumers and producers to be better educated about wine, 
were of a one-time, transitory nature. And some may have been continuing but were 
reduced or eliminated by other changes. A case in point is varietal regulations.
7.1  Varietal Regulations
Unlike California’s AVAs, European PDOs for wine designate the grape varie-
ties that may be used to produce PDO wine; and in some cases, the minimum and 
maximum proportions of each of those varieties in the blend. Producers in the same 
region are free to grow other varieties, which may be eligible for labeling as PGI 
wine, but they must satisfy varietal blend restrictions if they wish to use the valuable 
32 As described by Meloni and Swinnen (2013), between 1931 and 1935, a series of laws (Statut Viti-
cole) aimed at controlling wine supply were introduced, such as an obligation to store part of the excess 
production (blocage), obligatory distillation of surpluses, a ban on planting new vines, and premiums for 
grubbing up of overproductive vines. The introduction of the AOC system helped, but these other poli-
cies were more immediately important for reducing the wine glut.
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PDO designation. This can be a strong incentive to grow only those designated 
varieties.
Nowadays, however, many wines are sold with information about the varietal 
content of the wine on the label. This is particularly so for premium wines produced 
in the New World, but also increasingly so in Europe—and not only wines classified 
as “varietal wines” within the EU classification, which are non-GI wines. If vari-
etal information is (or can be) provided on the label, what additional information is 
conveyed by a law that restricts those varieties to come from a particular short list 
or in a particular mixture? Today, the term Bordeaux conveys both the region and 
the potential varietal blend. But in principle these aspects could be distinguished if 
both a traditional Bordeaux blend and other blends were permitted to be produced 
from within the same delimited PDO region and allowed to use the same PDO des-
ignation. Otherwise, denying the use of the designation Bordeaux is an implicit sig-
nal that the non-traditional blend is in some sense inferior—if only because it is 
non-traditional.
The implicit stigma against nontraditional varieties might be costly. Several 
aspects of the environmental and market context are placing pressures on the wine 
industry that potentially could be addressed by genetic innovations in varieties 
(either in the scions or the rootstocks to which they are grafted). Evolving consumer 
demand is one set of forces driving the demand for different types of grapes with 
different bundles of traits, including agronomic traits that facilitate the use of pro-
duction processes that qualify for eco-labels such as organic, biodynamic, sustaina-
ble, or non-GMO. Another set of forces is the public policy processes that are apply-
ing increasingly stringent restrictions on the use of pesticides and other agricultural 
chemicals in vineyards, increasing the demand for alternatives, including pest- and 
disease-resistant varieties. Finally, climate is changing in ways that have implica-
tions for the compatibility of varieties with the locations where they have been tradi-
tionally grown (see, e.g., Jones 2006, 2016, 2018).
Existing PDO rules constrain the potential for varietal innovation to address these 
stresses. But the varietal name per se is an important and valuable attribute of exist-
ing varieties used for wine making, even in the absence of PDO rules that prescribe 
growing traditional varieties. Varietal innovation will be hampered if the value of 
varietal names is large relative to the value of other traits that might also be desired 
such as higher yield, resistance to pests and diseases, or fruit quality attributes. Nev-
ertheless, some European producers have found it profitable to switch from PDO 
to PGI in order to be able to make varietal and other innovations (not admitted in 
PDOs).33 In the case of Super Tuscan wines, the upshot was an upside-down pyra-
mid, with higher prices for PGI than PDO wines.
Changes in climate and consumer demand for eco-labels may lead to further 
movement in this direction and ultimately might induce changes in the policy. For 
33 For example, the new wine, Terregiunte (connected-earths), born from the collaboration of two well-
known corporate brands, Masi from Veneto and Vespa from Puglia, combines wine from two separate 
PDOs and therefore is entitled to use only the generic name Italian wine, even though it is premium wine 
and priced accordingly.
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example, in 2019, producers in Bordeaux voted to allow the use of seven new varie-
ties for production of Bordeaux Supérieur wines (i.e., within the PDO, but not for 
the sub-appellations such as Pauillac or Saint-Émilion). These varieties are all V. 
vinifera, including some that are commercially significant in other parts of Europe, 
some that are crosses between familiar vinifera varieties, and some that are little 
known. These varieties might be adopted in response to changes in climate. Hybrid 
varieties offer more hope for coping with pests and diseases, and we see changes in 
this area, too.34
Environmental, health and cost concerns are leading European producers and 
policymakers to reconsider hybrids, which could allow for significant savings in 
costs to growers and reduced environmental and human health risks (see, e.g., Sam-
bucci et al., 2019). In response to pressure from the industry, revisions introduced 
in the 2009 CMO permit the use of hybrids (crosses with V. vinifera) to produce 
PGI wines, while preserving the rule that only V. vinifera varieties may be used to 
produce PDO wines. Grape breeders have succeeded in developing vinifera-like 
varieties with desirable pest- and disease-resistance attributes, and already in 2017, 
new hybrid varieties have been released by the French National Research Institute 
(INRA).
With a view to improved resistance to pests and diseases and resilience to cli-
mate change, the 2018 CAP reform proposal provides for a wider use of intra- and 
interspecific hybrids in both PDO and PGI wines (see, e.g., Pomarici and Sardone 
2020). However, individual Member States retain control over which varieties may 
be planted within individual PDOs and PGIs, depending on what their producers 
may wish. Moreover, even if permitted, growers might not find it profitable to adopt 
these hybrids if the hybrid varietal discount exceeds the fungicide cost savings (see, 
e.g., Fuller et al. 2015). These tradeoffs may become more favorable in the future, 
but for now this change in the rules does not promise to lead to major changes in 
practice any time soon.
Then we have genetic engineering. To a modern geneticist, cross-breeding (or 
random mutagenesis) and selection is a clumsy and imprecise way of improving 
varieties compared with gene-editing (drawing on the plant’s own genes to mani-
fest new traits) and the related tools of genetic engineering (transgenic modifica-
tions, producing GMOs). The rise of widespread opposition to GMOs in Europe 
was to a great extent driven by NGOs spreading false propaganda (see, e.g., Lynas 
2018), and is based largely on uninformed perceptions about the environmental con-
sequences of GMOs or the human health risks they pose: GMOs are often safer for 
34 Crosses between European Vitis vinifera and American varieties (inter-specific hybrids) became 
popular in Europe initially as a response to phylloxera. As discussed by Meloni and Swinnen (2013), 
these hybrids were a target for policy as a contributor to overproduction of lower-quality wine. Even 
though they were highly regulated under the AOC system, by the end of the 1950s hybrids still made up 
one-third of France’s vineyard area (and 42% of table wine production); however, with the subsidized 
replacement of some 325,000 ha of hybrids during the 1970s and 1980s, by the end of the 1980s this 
share had been reduced to less than 3% (Meloni and Swinnen 2013). It subsequently shrank to less than 
1%.
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people and the planet than the conventional technologies they would replace (Qaim 
2009; Klümper and Qaim 2014).35
Notwithstanding the mountain of scientific evidence, including that produced by 
European authorities, showing that GMOs pose no greater risk than conventional 
technologies, they have been effectively blocked and are not used to any meaning-
ful extent in Europe. If that were not bad enough, unfortunately, the relevant Euro-
pean authorities appear to have determined that new breeding techniques (NBTs) 
like gene-editing should be regulated like GMOs. In contrast, the USDA (which 
regulates GMOs) does not plan to regulate plants that were developed using NBTs 
if they could otherwise have been developed through conventional breeding. The 
upshot is that the European wine industry will have a much more limited range of 
options available as it seeks to respond through genetic innovation to the diverse 
pressures coming from the shifting environmental and market context. This is not a 
uniquely European problem. Even in the United States where GMOs have relatively 
high acceptance, the wine industry is cautious about GMOs and many consumers 
are demanding wines with ecolabels favoring traditional technologies (Box 1).
Box 1: Ecolabels and Other Label Claims
In some senses the demand for ecolabels reflects a preference for anything but genetic innovations, 
even though genetic innovation—through hybrids or gene-editing—might have the greatest potential 
for providing sustainable solutions to environmental threats such as climate change and evolving pest 
and disease pressures. Around the world, led from Europe, consumers and environmental activists are 
demanding a shift toward more environmentally sustainable production systems throughout agricul-
ture, including vineyards and wine. Many wine producers themselves share these aspirations, even to 
the extent of adopting practices that would be unprofitable otherwise.
Consequently, for both ethical and commercial reasons, a growing share of the total volume of wine 
is produced using various purportedly sustainable practices, and some of that is sold with some kind of 
ecolabel—such as organic, biodynamic, natural, sustainable, or non-GMO. Still, even in France only 
10% of the total vineyard area in 2017 was organic (Alonso Ugaglia et al. 2019). In some cases, like 
organic, these terms are clearly defined and have legal meaning (supported by government certification), 
though the meaning may vary among jurisdictions. (For example, in the United States organic wine 
means wine made with organically grown grapes and without added sulfites, but in the EU sulfites can 
be added lawfully in making organic wine.) This is a profoundly important difference because making 
stable wines without sulfites is much more difficult. In other cases, such as “natural,” the terms are used 
much less formally, without any specific legal definition. The term biodynamic falls in between, using 
private certification with a defined set of rules, networked internationally through Demeter International.
One problem with these terms is that most consumers are not well-informed about the specific mean-
ing and implications of particular ecolabels. Uninformed consumers might presume that an ecolabel 
carries with it the promise that the grapes were produced without using synthetic pesticides such that the 
wine might have desired food safety attributes and a smaller environmental footprint. Even if this were 
true for organic wine, which is open to challenge, the extent of the benefits is not easy to judge; even 
more so with other ecolabels like natural or sustainable, when promises regarding production practices 
are vague. Consequently, we face a new lemons problem in the context of asymmetric information about 
the environmental footprint and food-safety aspects of wine conveyed by ecolabels. The commercial use 
of such terms has not been much regulated, an example of government failure.
35 Genetically engineered (GE) crops often have a smaller environmental footprint than their conven-
tional counterparts (see, e.g., Wu 2006; Klümper and Qaim 2014). Conventional cross-breeding and 
selection involves multiple uncontrolled changes, mutatis mutandis, whereas gene-editing and transgenic 
insertion involve single controlled changes, ceteris paribus, and is less risky in that sense (see, e.g., Qaim 
2009).
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7.2  Yield Restrictions
Both PGIs and PDOs typically specify maximum yields per hectare in terms of both 
fruit production (kg/ha) and wine production (hl/ha). These restrictions are supposed 
(commonly claimed) to have the effect of improving the quality of the wine, but even 
this is a somewhat controversial idea. To be sure, the introduction of process regu-
lations as part of appellation rules did lead to substantial improvements in average 
quality in the early years (see, e.g., Mérel et al. 2019); and in today’s market, across 
locations, and across vintages for a given location, higher yields tend to be associ-
ated with lower-priced wine grapes and lower-priced (or lower-rated) wine (see, e.g., 
Alston et al. 2015). Even so, in many cases in today’s market, these yield restrictions 
that are very costly for producers could be relaxed without causing a material loss in 
wine quality (i.e., in the average revenue per unit holding quantity constant).
Yield restrictions are controversial for two reasons. First, among grape growers 
and scientists working in the area, there is some debate over whether cultural prac-
tices that reduce yield are an effective or economical means for improving quality of 
the vintage compared with other management practices (see, e.g., Matthews 2015). 
It is a complex question because quality has many dimensions, and growers have 
many means available for managing yield and fruit quality attributes.36 The links 
between these management practices, as they affect the total yield, and diverse fruit 
attributes that can contribute to various aspects of wine quality are complicated and 
not always well-understood, even by grape growers and other experts.
At least over some of the feasible yield range we would expect to observe a trade-
off between yield and quality—at a minimum this can be accomplished by grading 
out lower quality fruit and wine—and it is likely to be economically rational for 
producers to be producing within that range if they are free to do so. But as we show 
next, it is much less likely to be economically rational for society to restrict the pro-
ducers’ choice within that range using a blunt instrument policy of yield restriction 
applied uniformly to all producers within the appellation.
To begin, consider an appellation that includes numerous identical producers, 
each of which is producing at some point on the same quantity-quality production 
possibilities frontier as depicted in Fig. 2 for a representative hectare: labeled  PPF1. 
In this figure,  Vmin denotes the minimum (economic) quality in the sense that fur-
ther reductions in quality do not allow further increases in yield (above  Ymax), while 
 Vmax denotes the maximum (economic) quality in the sense that further reductions 
in yield (below  Ymin) do not allow further increases in quality. If markets were func-
tioning well at signaling the demand for wine quality attributes, producers would all 
choose to produce at point A, where the magnitude of the slope of the production 
possibilities frontier is equal to the quality premium (indicated by the line,  M1). At 
this point, yield and quality are optimal at  Y1 and  V1. However, if consumers can-
not discern quality, such that the premium for quality is zero, producers would be 
36 Lower yields might reflect smaller berries, and a higher ratio of skin (which provides flavors) to pulp, 
and consequently more-intensely flavored wines; they might reflect delayed harvest, which can result in 
riper and more concentrated fruit flavors as grapes become desiccated; they might reflect pruning, green 
thinning, or other management practices that reduce the total crop but increase homogeneity at harvest.
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induced to produce at point B (the maximum quantity)—an extreme lemons prob-
lem, with quality,  Vmin.37
Suppose a social planner imposes a maximum yield,  YC aiming to correct the 
distortion. In this scenario the constraint will be exactly binding: the regulated maxi-
mum yield will become the yield, with its associated quality  VC—i.e., point C. The 
challenge for the social planner is to understand enough about the trade-off to set the 
constraint in the right place—even in this simplest possible scenario. In reality, this 
is a very serious challenge. In an extreme case, the social planner might set a maxi-
mum below the yield,  YD that corresponds to the maximum possible quality,  Vmax 
such that over some of the range, yield and output could be increased without any 
reduction in quality. We have informal evidence—based on discussions with numer-
ous grape growers and wine makers about their personal experience, and broader 
observations from scientists and others—that at least some and perhaps many pro-
ducers are restricted to this extent by current rules. They could significantly increase 
their yield without any loss of quality.
A second set of issues arises when the same yield restriction is imposed across 
places with diverse production environments and across varied seasons in a given 
place. A restriction that is close to the median producer’s optimum quality-quantity 
tradeoff, will not be binding for half the producers and will be overly restrictive for 
the other half. To illustrate, Fig. 2 includes a second production possibilities fron-
tier, labeled  PPF2, with the two frontiers potentially representing different produc-
ers (producers 1 and 2) in the same year, or the same producer in different years 
(vintages 1 and 2). It is easy to see in this figure how a yield restriction at  Y1 that 
is optimal for producer 1, given the market valuation of quality,  M1, is unlikely to 
be optimal for producer 2 or for producers as a group. This is a significant concern 
since, even within a modest-sized estate of a few hectares, we might find individual 
patches with very different soil types, terrain, or exposure, which taken together may 
imply very different production possibilities (i.e., terroir).
Likewise, for any given producer, when seasonal conditions vary across vin-
tages in ways that shift the quality-quantity tradeoff—which they surely do—a yield 
restriction that is optimal for vintage 1, at  Y1 given the market valuation of quality, 
 M1, will not be optimal for vintage 2. This observation, related to the effects of year-
to-year weather changes also applies to secular changes in the production possibili-
ties frontier associated with improved understanding of viticulture and enology, the 
adoption of alternative production systems, or climate change. This can be impor-
tant if yield restrictions determined at a particular point in time might be held fixed 
over many years or even decades.
A third set of issues arises because the social planner is presumed to know the 
optimal premium for quality, the associated optimal quality mix, and the (maxi-
mum) yield that will result in that perfect outcome. This is a lot to know, even if the 
37 In this depiction, we assume producers are well informed and rational, so they achieve outcomes on 
the frontier, which represents the maximum attainable quality for given yield, and vice versa. As noted 
above, the introduction of technological regulations under appellations may have had significant didac-
tive effects, which could be depicted as moving producers to the frontier from technically inefficient out-
comes below it.
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relationships would be fixed over time and among producers and if quality were a 
simple, one-dimensional construct, as it has been presented in this didactic exercise. 
In fact, wine is one of the world’s most highly differentiated products, its quality 
is multidimensional, and the market is constantly in flux. The potential for error is 
large. What if the relevant price premium is very different from  M1, or if the relevant 
premium is very different among different producers or must change because the 
market has evolved?
8  Technological Regulations in a Market Context
Yield restrictions ostensibly serving as quality assurance might also have been 
intended to limit production and raise prices and profits for producers. While poten-
tially increasing average quality, binding yield restrictions also have the effect of 
reducing the volume of appellation wine produced, which in turn has consequences 
for prices, production, and consumption of wine. The ultimate consequences in real-
ity will depend on how well the policies are enforced, which will depend on the 


















Fig. 2  Quality consequences of yield restrictions
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8.1  Market Effects of Yield Restrictions
In Fig. 3,  S0 is the total supply of wine from a specific region in the absence of yield 
restrictions or other controls, and  D0 is the demand for wine from the region, which 
slopes down—the region is large in the sense of being able to influence the price of 
its wine by managing its supply. Certainly, Europe is a large producer and exporter of 
both quality wine and table wine, in this sense, as is each of the main wine produc-
ing countries: France, Italy, and Spain. It can be profitable for the industry in a large 
country or region to restrict supply and exercise market power in trade at the expense 
of both foreign and domestic consumers, and the resulting gains to domestic produc-
ers might even exceed the costs borne by domestic consumers. However, even the 
largest wine GIs would not be expected to have much market power in the sense that, 
if they were to independently restrict their total supply, they could generate an appre-
ciable increase in their average revenue or price (which requires downward sloping 
demand facing the GI) let alone total revenue (which requires inelastic demand fac-
ing the GI). Overall demand is likely to be fairly elastic even for the largest and most 
distinctive wine GIs. Moreover, yield restrictions have serious deficiencies as instru-
ments of supply control, and at least some of the potential gains from the exercise of 
market power will be dissipated in costs of input mix distortions, as we illustrate next.
Let us assume that, when the region establishes a PDO or PGI, with restrictions 
on yield and other aspects of production, this results in an increase in average qual-
ity.38 In Fig. 3, the increase in quality is represented as an increase in demand from 
 D0 to  D1 (reflecting an increase in consumer willingness to pay for any given quan-
tity). A further increase in demand, from  D1 to  D2 is implied if, at the same time, the 
policy has resulted in an improvement in consumer confidence in the quality of the 
product, a collective reputation effect. Meanwhile, the industry supply (and marginal 
cost) function shifts up to the left, from  S0 to  S1 reflecting the increased cost of pro-
duction caused by the restrictions.
Consequently, the market equilibrium has shifted from the intersection of  D0 
with  S0 at point a  (Q0,  P0) to the intersection of  D2 with  S1 at point b  (Q1,  P1). The 
increase in price reflects both the quality premium and the effects of reduced quan-
tity supplied, in spite of the premium. These changes imply a change in the total 
economic surplus in this market from area ⟨faj⟩ to area ⟨dbj⟩ , comprising a change 
in consumer surplus (from area ⟨faP0⟩ to area ⟨dbP1⟩ ) and a change in producer sur-
plus (from area ⟨jaP0⟩ to area ⟨gbP1⟩).39 Whether these changes amount to increases 
or decreases depends on the relative sizes of the shifts in supply and demand, and 
to some extent on the nature of the shifts (drawn here as divergent to some extent) 
38 As discussed in the context of Fig. 2, if producers can influence quality by varying factor proportions, 
we would expect the introduction of a restriction on yield to induce an increase in average quality.
39 The demand reflects all consumers, whether from within the jurisdiction imposing the regulations 
(e.g., a member of the EU) or elsewhere (e.g., other countries). For some purposes, it might be appro-
priate to conduct a welfare analysis partitioning the demand (and consumer surplus) between domestic 
and foreign consumers. This may change the calculus in favor of the policy since restricting supply is a 
mechanism for exercising market power in trade and extracting economic surplus from foreign consum-
ers, even if also at the expense of domestic consumers—see, e.g., Johnson (1965) and Sumner and Alston 
(1984) for an application to U.S. tobacco.
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and the slopes of the curves. If the upwards shift in the demand curve (reflecting 
the value of improved quality and quality assurance) is large relative to the upwards 
shift in supply (reflecting the costs of those improvements borne by producers), then 
both producers and consumers are likely to gain.
This analysis allows that yield restrictions are a costly way of accomplishing the 
desired quality improvement and quality signaling because, for the reasons discussed 
above (in the context of the discussion around Fig. 2), the single-valued maximum 
restriction will be sub-optimal for at least some producers in at least some years. 
The third supply function reflects the costs of supplying the same overall quality of 
wine, but doing so in the least-cost fashion by allowing each producer to optimize 
the quantity-quality trade-off, given the market premium for quality. We can imagine 
moving toward this outcome if the blanket yield restriction could be replaced with 
some more selective mechanism for signaling quality within the industry, or leaving 
it to the market given today’s comparatively effective market information mecha-
nisms. If eliminating yield restrictions would allow an increase from  S1 to  S2 while 
preserving quality signaling, the new equilibrium would be at the intersection of  D2 
with  S2 at point c  (Q2,  P2), yielding additional social benefits equal to area ⟨gbch⟩ in 
Fig. 3, definitely benefiting consumers (gains equal to area ⟨P1bcP2⟩ ) and potentially 
also benefiting producers.
So far, we have abstracted from the effect of policy-induced changes in the market 
for appellation wines on the market for table wines. To the extent that the restrictions 
are binding, and given barriers to increasing the total area of vineyard, yield restric-
tions do have the effect of reducing the volume of appellation wine produced. The con-
sequences may be seen as a means of de facto price discrimination between consumers 
of appellation wine (of which less is produced) and table wine (of which potentially 
more is produced). In their analysis of the combined supply-restricting and demand-
enhancing effects from quality regulations imposed by a PDO, Mérel and Sexton 
(2012, p. 570) find that “… the European GI regulations may in essence have replaced 
a pooling equilibrium with deficient product quality in the absence of intervention 
with a separating equilibrium involving a ‘generic’ product with fixed low quality and 
a GI product with excessive quality relative to the social optimum.” Mérel and Sexton 
(2012) did not model the efficiency losses from yield restrictions as quality controls, 
implicitly assuming that producers would supply the desired quality at minimum cost.
At some level, any technological regulation may be questionable as an eco-
nomic policy tool; typically, economists will argue for the use of instruments that 
are closely targeted to the economic purpose and that allow market transactions to 
reveal opportunity costs (as in the use of cap-and-trade programs rather than tech-
nological regulations to manage emissions from oil refineries). This kind of think-
ing has been generally absent from discussions of EU wine policy. Our discussion 
of varietal and yield restrictions illustrates the general point in the context of the 
vineyard. Other examples in the context of the winery are also interesting (see, e.g., 
Appendix Box B-1).
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8.2  Enforcement Costs and Cheating
Our analysis thus far has abstracted from the issue of enforcement costs, the conse-
quentially imperfect enforcement of regulations, and the lawbreaking that ensues. 
While we do not have any hard data on the extent of such behavior, we have evi-
dence that some European wine producers do find it profitable to avoid comply-
ing with at least some of the regulations, some of which are not easy to enforce. It 
should be comparatively easy to enforce planting restrictions because area of vine-
yards is easy to observe. Nevertheless, as reported by Meloni et al. (2019, p. 637), 
the EU system of planting rights has seen considerable enforcement challenges: “In 
2012 the European Commission imposed a fine of 250 million Euros on Greece, 
Italy, and Spain because of an estimated 120,000 hectares of vineyards planted ille-
gally, that is, without planting rights; an area about the size of all vineyards in the 
Bordeaux region.”
Compared with area restrictions, especially for a perennial crop, yield and out-
put restrictions are much more difficult to enforce, and more so in a case like this 
where the farmer produces a finished good, ready for the final consumer. Hard data 
on these phenomena are understandably elusive. However, producers have strong 
incentives to engage in black-market trade to meet shortfalls from allowable yield, 
or even exceed it. Indeed, based on informal advice from industry participants we 
guesstimate that, at least in some vintages, total production of wine in at least some 
PDOs may be as much as 30% greater than the official statistics based on permitted 
yields.
This is not a unique (or even unusual) situation, but very little of the published 
work in the economics of agricultural policy has paid serious attention to enforce-
ment costs and cheating, and most of the published studies that do consider these 
aspects are conceptual rather than empirical. For example, Giannakas and Fulton 
(2000) analyze redistribution of economic surplus using agricultural output quotas 
in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating. As they show, when quotas are 
imperfectly enforced producers may find it profitable to produce more than their 
legally allowed amount. Compared with perfect enforcement, the greater quantity 
produced implies a smaller social cost of distortions associated with restricting out-
put. Offsetting that saving, producers and sellers (and perhaps buyers) of undocu-
mented production incur costs of bearing the risk of detection and punishment, and 
measures they take to avoid detection. In addition to these costs of compliance with 
the law (or cheating to evade it) we have costs of administration and enforcement of 
the policy.
These types of trade-offs are potentially important in the context of EU wine 
policy, but they are not represented in the analysis of Fig. 3, which is conventional 
in this respect. Once we have some kind of black market, the supply and demand 
curves drawn in Fig.  3 are no longer strictly relevant as such; nor is the concept 
of equilibrium with a single market clearing price. The quantity produced will fall 
somewhere between the quantity that would be produced with full enforcement 
of the policy and the quantity that would be produced with no policy restricting 
yields. As well as having implications for the net social costs of the policies, these 
economizing responses to the regulations will have complex consequences for the 
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distribution of costs and benefits, all of which tends to weaken the case for using 
such policies.
8.3  Governance and Regulatory Capture
As noted, along with changes in the definition of the spatial limits of the respective 
regions included in some appellations and other rules of the appellations, the num-
ber of appellations has been changing over time. Do we have too many appellations? 
Are the mechanisms for managing the structure of the appellations (including the 
spatial limits and other rules) open to capture by powerful vested interests? Do the 
decisions made by the producer organizations serve social purposes well?
The appellation system is administered by public authorities and producer organi-
zations, and they are vulnerable to regulatory capture and government failure. This 
is a diverse industry that includes some very large producers, some of whom are 
politically and economically powerful, and may be active in multiple regions and 
wine GIs, along with a multitude of small producers, who might participate in pol-
icy processes only indirectly, through the cooperatives that process their wine. It is 
unlikely that any policy developed in the context of a producer organization will 
serve all of these diverse interests equally well, or that all of the interested parties 
will be equally effectively represented in the policymaking process.
The organizations (called Consorzi in Italy) governing wine GIs are democratic 
organizations, usually with three or four categories of members: grape growers, 
integrated grower-vintners, cooperatives, and commercial bottlers. Some deci-
sions are determined by a vote of the industry members of the organizations; oth-
ers by their elected representatives (board members). Although the voting power 
could be based on the volume of production—one ton (or one hl) = one vote—the 
votes are not distributed in this fashion in practice. Regulations exist to reduce 
the relative strength of the vote (per ton produced) of individual members who 
produce larger volumes and act independently, while cooperatives that represent 
many small producers are able effectively to exercise disproportionate influence 
on decisions.
These details may differ among Member States and organizations governing the 
GIs within them. Under Italian law, for example, whenever the board of a Consorzio 
proposes an action to reduce maximum yield or to introduce any other measure for 
reducing supply, the official procedure states that this action should be approved by 
the regional government and by a vote of an assembly of the members of the Con-
sorzio. A proposal to reduce supply will inevitably have different—some favorable, 
some unfavorable—consequences for different industry participants. Hence, such 
proposals are always controversial, perhaps for good reasons.
Most individual wine GIs would not be seen as economically large producers 
able to exercise significant market power and profit substantially by restricting sup-
ply from the appellation. Even so, in recent times we have seen decisions taken 
within many wine GIs to introduce various measures to reduce the total produc-
tion, without any pretense that the purpose was to enhance quality or collective 
reputation or overcome a lemons problem. Table 4 includes examples of policies 
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Table 4  Actions taken in 2019 to protect Italian PDOs
Source: Created by the authors drawing on various online sources including: https:// www. prose cco. it/ wp- 
conte nt/ uploa ds/ 2019/ 08/ Prime- Indic azioni_ Tecni che_ di- vende mmia- 2019_ v2. pdf, https:// www. quali 
vita. it/ wp- conte nt/ uploa ds/ 2019/ 07/ 20190 731_ RS_ QN_ VALPO LICEL LA. pdf, https:// www. agric ultura. 
it/ 2019/ 07/ 26/ doc- sicil ia- conso rzio- riduce- le- rese- delle- uve- grillo- a- 110- quint ali- ad- ettaro- per- la- vende 
mmia- 2019/, https:// www. ilmes sagge ro. it/ umbria/ orvie to_ vino_ crisi_ la_ regio ne_ blocca_ impia nto_ di_ 
nuovi_ vigne ti_ anni- 42243 32. html, https:// delle venez ie. it/ delib ere- blocco- riven dica- per- il- trien nio- 2019- 
2022/, http:// www. uiv. it/ lemil ia- romag na- ha- autor izzato- 512- ettari- di- nuovo- vigne to/, https:// winen ews. 
it/ it/ il- lugana- ed- il- futuro- chies to- lo- stocc aggio- del- 10- della- vende mmia- 2019- stop-a- nuovi- impia nti_ 
394501/, https:// www. langh evini. it/ barolo- nuovi- impia nti- blocc ati- per- tre- anni/
*Corriere Dell’Alto Adige; 7 settembre’19, pagina 11
Organization Actions taken
Consorzio di Tutela Prosecco DOC Reduction of the grape-to-wine ratio from 135 to 120 quintals
Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2021
Consorzio di Tutela Vini Valpolicella Reduction of the grape-to-wine ratio from 120 to 110 quintals
Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2022
Decrease from 65 to 40% in the proportion of wine grapes in 
Valpolicella DOC that may be used for Amarone and Recioto 
della Valpolicella
Consorzio di Tutela Vini DOC Sicilia Reduction of the grape-to-wine ratio for Grillo grapes to 110 
quintals
Consorzio di Tutela Vini Orvieto Reduction of the grape-to-wine ratio from 80 to 75 quintals 
(since 2018)
Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2021
Consorzio DOC Delle Venezie Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2022
Regione Emilia-Romagna Allowing 512,79 new hectares of vineyards for a total amount of 
2,684 farms
Consorzio Tutela Lugana Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2021
Compulsory storage of the wine obtained from the 2019 harvest, 
until December 31, 2020 to support the market price
Increased intensity of inspection by the consortium of vineyards 
until the 3rd year of age, to more closely monitor farmers’ 
operations and better enforce the consortium grape-to-wine 
ratio (70%)
Consorzio di Tutela Barolo Bar-
baresco Alba Langhe e Dogliani
Moratorium on new vineyards covered by the PDO until harvest 
of 2022
Decrease in the grape-to-wine ratio from 80 to 70% for wines 
apt to be Barolo Riserva that benefits from MEGA (Additional 
Geographic Mention)
Consorzio Vini Alto Adige* Reduction by 25% in the grape-to-wine ratio and thus in the total 
amount of production allowed
Allowing a maximum of five winegrape varieties per suitable 
production area: a total of 86 terroir parcels waiting for MEGA 
recognition
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introduced by the boards of the Consorzi of several Italian GIs under the system 
of authorizations for new plantings. In 2019, six of the nine Consorzi in Table 4 
introduced a moratorium on new vineyards to be covered by the GI for the next 
2 or 3  years. Others imposed tighter restrictions on the allowable grape-to-wine 
ratio for appellation wine which, combined with a restriction on grape yield and a 
fixed existing area of vineyard, acts effectively as a tighter restriction on volume of 
appellation wine to be produced.
In 2020, we have seen the implementation of even tighter yield restrictions on 
appellation wine as a response to the worsening market situation under the COVID-
19 pandemic by some of the same Consorzi (e.g., Prosecco, Valpollicella, and 
Brunello di Mongtalcino). It cannot be claimed that the purpose of these yield 
restrictions was to enhance quality, and nor is it likely that they will accomplish that 
purpose. Rather, this can only be a crude mechanism for reducing the total quantity 
of quality wine in the face of an exacerbated supply–demand imbalance. Producers 
will seek and receive other emergency assistance, no doubt. Repeating the pattern of 
the past, European policymakers seem unlikely to take full advantage of the current 
crisis as an opportunity to embrace a shake-out of the industry and a shift towards a 
more sustainable long-run trajectory for the industry.
9  Synthesis and Conclusion
European wine policy is centered on a system of GIs that entail significant tech-
nological regulations restricting the varieties that may be grown and the maxi-
mum yields per hectare, along with other rules regarding grape production and 
winemaking practice. In this article, we have raised questions about the extent to 
which these technological regulations are valuable today, given (1) the potential 
for alternative sources of information to solve the lemons problem, (2) evidence 
that the appellation system per se might not be effectively serving that purpose as 
well as it once did, and (3) evidence that some of the regulations impose signifi-
cant social costs.
Since 1970, GIs for wine have operated within a broader European wine policy 
that sought to harmonize appellation rules and other policies across Member States 
and overcome some inherent structural problems. From the outset, EU wine policy 
was destined for trouble because the floor price for table wine was set above the 
market clearing price, causing excess supply, especially of the lowest-quality wine. 
This had long-lasting effects. The policy induced an increase in total productive 
capacity, especially in the production of lower quality, undifferentiated table wine, 
and the excess supply problem became worse over time reflecting longer-run supply 
response to an enduring change in incentives that contradicted market trends. The 
wine policy has evolved to address this structural issue, including very significant 
(and expensive) intervention to reduce excess supply, while seeking to preserve the 
essence of the appellation system. The GIs for wine have also evolved, but perhaps 
too slowly.
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Today, limitations on the varieties that may be grown within a particular location 
to qualify for premium status seem excessive in a world where varietal labels can be 
used to signal that aspect of the production process, and where the economic environ-
ment of production is changing in ways that exacerbate the costs of inflexible restric-
tions on varietal choice. We have already seen some initiatives in relation to varietal 
innovations—as a response to climate change—that would have been unthinkable a 
decade or so in the past. However, we also see strong headwinds of opposition to the 
most promising methods for making varietal innovations to address emerging envi-
ronmental, marketing, and policy challenges—such as GMOs, gene-edited plants, or 
hybrids.
Several questions arise in the context of yield restrictions. First, do they effec-
tively result in an increase in average quality that enhances the collective reputa-
tion of wine from a PDO or PGI? Second, what are the implications of hetero-
geneity of quality, inherent in the design of the policy that appears to ignore this 
aspect? Even if yield restrictions are effective at enhancing average quality, in a 
highly heterogeneous and variable production environment a blanket yield restric-
tion is an economically ill-suited instrument for enhancing and signaling quality. 
Third, is the true purpose of yield restrictions supply control? If so, this should 
be made explicit and evaluated, since yield restrictions are likely to be an eco-
nomically inefficient instrument for that purpose, even if combined with planting 
restrictions.
The fact that the restrictions on yields and other rules are imperfectly enforced 
is a mixed blessing. It reduces the harm that is done when rules are inappropriate 
and costly. However, at the same time it undermines the purpose of policies that are 
meant to serve a broader social purpose, and at some level it undermines the social 
fabric more broadly, by creating a culture of lawlessness and a loss of trust in institu-
tions. Some industry participants may be dissatisfied with the system for other rea-
sons also related to lack of confidence in the institutions and fairness.
Governance and regulatory capture is a neglected topic that warrants further 
study. The governance structures for the wine GIs might be contributing to forms 
of government failure in that the organizations might be devising and implementing 
policy in ways that do not represent the interests of producers adequately or serve 
the broader society well. A related issue is that the governance structure of the GIs 
might be contributing to the inertia and slowness to reform some rules and regula-
tions that no longer serve the broader society well, though they may still serve some 
narrower vested interests.
In this article we have conjectured that some aspects of the wine appellation sys-
tem that were once economically useful might no longer pass the cost–benefit test in 
today’s much-changed wine world. Our analysis shows that the technological regula-
tions restricting yields and varieties are of dubious value in today’s circumstances. 
As well as saving the costs of resource distortions, Europe could save the heavy bur-
den of regulatory enforcement and compliance. In the other wine-producing coun-
tries that are competing well against the EU, GI systems for wine operate success-
fully without restricting varietal choices for producers and without imposing yield 
restrictions—used in European GIs ostensibly to enhance quality but more clearly 
as a clumsy and economically inefficient way to restrict supply. Clearly, it would be 
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economically better for the EU to abandon yield restrictions as a way of trying to 
manage quality and quantity, and to find ways to sustainably support European wine 
producers that do not encourage them to produce wine that the market manifestly 
does not want. Wine policies introduced in the 2009 CAP reform, and subsequently, 
seek to facilitate structural change and enhance demand. Policies of this type could 
continue to complement a better-conceived system of support for the industry and 
quality signaling for consumers.
Appendix Box B‑1 Arbitrary Regulations on Use of Water and Sugar 
in Winemaking
Imagine two wine economists, one from the Old World (say, northern France—
call him Pierre) and the other from the New World (say, California or Australia—
call him Jim). In Pierre’s world it is sacrilegious to add water to wine in the wine-
making process; the EU rules of wine-making absolutely forbid it—in Europe, 
nowadays, the only way water can be made into wine is by the grapevine! Con-
versely, in Jim’s world it is permissible to add water if necessary to complete the 
fermentation process; sometimes there is simply too much sugar and the alcohol 
kills the yeast. In Pierre’s world, the opposite problem arises. The grapevine does 
not produce enough sugar to meet the legal minimum (and desired) alcohol con-
tent, and it is common in Europe to add considerable amounts of sucrose (from 
sugar cane or sugar beet) to strengthen the wine. In contrast, this practice—chap-
talization—is prohibited (heresy!) in California, though not in some cooler U.S. 
states, such as Oregon. California winemakers may add grape juice concentrate, 
as may winemakers in Italy—who used significant quantities of subsidized grape 
must at times (which could have come from outside the DOC or DOCG)—but 
not those in France.
A reasonable person might conclude that specific technological regulations like 
these are not based in any natural law related to wine per se, but rather are a lit-
tle capricious and somewhat arbitrary—more like a matter of convenience, accom-
modating the applicable environmental conditions that vary from place to place—
which might account for the highly moralistic tone assumed in discussion of the 
sanctity of such rules. California has abundant sunshine and heat, and consequently 
permits the addition of water, to reduce excessive sugar concentration, but does 
not permit the addition of sugar. France has the converse situation, especially in 
the cooler northern parts, in that grapevines do not produce enough sugar. In mak-
ing fine French wine it is unthinkable to dilute grape juice with water, and it is de 
rigueur to strengthen it with sugar—so long as the sugar is derived from an entirely 
different species! We can wonder if climate change might bring about some flex-
ibility in these fundamentally climate-driven rules.
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Appendix Box B‑2 Information Asymmetries and Signaling Issues 
in Wine Markets
It is commonly claimed that wine is an experience good, implying that although 
consumers cannot judge wine until they taste it, they can judge wine when they 
do taste it, and it is these sensory attributes of wine that really matter for their 
appreciation and valuation of the product. Much evidence exists to belie these 
seemingly straightforward ideas. The Journal of Wine Economics has published 
numerous articles demonstrating the fallibility of wine judges and other experts 
(see, e.g., Hodgson 2008, 2009). If the acknowledged experts cannot consistently 
assess wine, why should an amateur be any more successful? Other articles in the 
same journal show that wine is a horizontally differentiated good in that different 
consumers like and value different attributes (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2008), and that 
sensory perceptions and willingness to pay for wine are significantly affected by 
context including the price of the wine, scores from expert raters, information on 
the label about the wine, and other environmental factors (e.g., Goldstein 2019). 
The market for wine consequently abounds with information asymmetries and 
complex signaling problems.
Wine producers understand these attributes of their customers and the mar-
ketplace in which they operate, and they produce and market their wines accord-
ingly. Some strange outcomes emerge. For example, because consumers have 
come to believe that wine with screw-caps is inferior, producers of better wines 
are likely to use corks to signal high quality, even if the cork itself is an infe-
rior closure and more likely to result in damaged wine. Likewise, if consumers 
believe that particular aspects of the production process (e.g., old vines, low-
yielding, biodynamic) result in higher quality wines (whether because it is inher-
ent in the wine, or because of some implied scarcity or exclusiveness), producers 
may accordingly find it profitable to restrict yields so they can use low-yield as 
a signal of quality, even if restricting yields does not actually enhance quality. 
Some aspects of the PDO rules seem to be contributing to these outcomes—not 
just in Europe—and the rules might be perpetuated for the same kind of circular 
cause-and-effect reasons. Indeed, some PDOs require corks to be used.
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